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I  Introduction 
Complexity science is relevant to Antitrust Policy because the economy is a complex adaptive 
system of economic and non-economic actors.1 The study of complexity focuses our attention on 
the way complex behaviour in natural, biological, social or economic systems arises from 
interactions among the parts rather than from any inherent complexity of the parts; simple rules of 
interaction can give rise to complex system behaviour over time.  The importance of feedback 
effects and the way systems, learn, adapt and evolve are also emphasised, which are the processes 
by which the rules of interaction and mix of players in a system change over time.  As Stuart 
Kauffman nicely expresses it – the winning games are the games the winners play.2 
In this paper, based on theories of complex adaptive systems, I argue that the main case for 
antitrust policy should be extended to include the criteria of “evolvability.”3  To date, the main case 
focuses on economizing, including market power as a key filter for identifying suspect cases.4  Both 
production and transaction costs are considered as part of economizing and other factors are use to 
                                                
1 W. Brian Arthur, Steven N. Durlauf and David A. Lane eds. THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING COMPLEX 
SYSTEM II (1997). 
2 Stuart Kauffman INVESTIGATIONS (2000). 
3 I use the term “main case” in the same way as Oliver E. Williamson does in his book THE MECHANISMS OF 
GOVERNMENT (1996). 
4 Ibid. 
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consider the benefits of different industry structures.  CAS analysis focuses attention on dynamics, 
evolution and networks.  As I will show, the criteria of evolvability requires us to consider various 
types of direct and indirect network impacts in business that go beyond the traditional focus on 
production and transaction costs. These network impacts stem from the connections between 
transactions and relations over time and place, including how business arrangements at one time, 
limit or enable arrangements in the future.  An assessment of the impacts, I argue, can and should 
be included in the rules of antitrust and in the processes of antitrust case analysis and decision 
making.   
Much of what I have to say is not really new to economic and business theory. My ideas 
about complexity and business build on the theories of institutional evolution of Douglas North,5 
the pioneering work of Nelson and Winter on evolutionary econmics,6 the concerns of cutting edge 
economists7 and the work of researchers on economic and business systems associated with the 
Santa Fe Institute and Agent Based Computational Economics.8  But I believe the time is ripe now 
to bring these ideas together and to see what they mean for public policy and, in particular, antitrust 
policy.   
Developments in the so called “complexity sciences” - the study or complex adaptive 
systems (CAS) – provide ways for us to understand, analyse, map and model business network 
impacts over time and place that can assist antitrust decisions and policy development. Of particular 
importance are new types of methodologies for modelling the dynamics and evolution of CAS 
                                                
5 Douglas North Economic Performance through Time NOBEL PRIZE LECTURE (1993). 
6 Richard R. Nelson and Sidney Winter AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). 
7 David Colander, Richard P.F. Holt, and J.B. Rosser Jr. THE CHANGING FACE OF ECONOMICS (2004). 
8 see for example Arthur et al supra (1997).  
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using agent based models. These models are not the same as the statistical and mathematical 
methods we use to in analysing firm and industry behaviour.  Traditional methods cannot deal with 
the inherent nonlinearity of CAS, which arise from interaction and feedback effects taking place 
among the parts, and the consequent multiple equilibria and behaviour regimes that arise.  The only 
way to study such systems is to play out their behavior over time via computer simulations using 
agent based models.  Such simulations play the same role as mathematical and statistical methods; 
they force us to be explicit about the rules governing behaviour and interactions and about 
contextual assumptions.  The logic of the program reveals the implications of the rules and 
assumptions for system behaviour.  It is from simulation studies of this type, as well as other types 
of numerical simulations, that the hallmarks of CAS behaviour have been revealed, including 
sensitivity of outcomes to starting conditions, path dependence, bifurcations or tipping points, 
basins of attraction and the stability of different system attractors. The term Artificial Life is 
sometimes used to characterize these types of models because they mimic the processes of living, 
reproducing and evolving.  As Chris Langton, one of the founding fathers, observed, we are 
restricted to the study of what nature has left around for us to study and this results from one play of 
the tape of life – life as it is.9  Artificial Life methods allow us to consider alternative evolutionary 
conditions and pathways - to investigate life as it could be.  As I will show, these types of models 
and simulations offer a way forward for Antitrust case analysis and decision-making. 
A Links to Antitrust 
Antitrust policy is about influencing the rules of interaction and evolution of business systems, with 
the aim of avoiding pathological evolutionary paths and the emergence, survival and reproduction 
of undesirable firms and business systems.  My reading of recent critiques of antitrust policy 
indicate that current policies focus primarily on problems of static market efficiency and price 
                                                
9 Chris Langton ed. ARTIFICIAL LIFE (1996).  
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competition rather than dynamic market efficiency and value. Static market efficiency is reflected in 
rules to preserve price competitive markets and to limit market power, which is interpreted in terms 
of the distribution of market shares in horizontally defined domestic markets for substitutable and 
similar products or services.  Dynamic market efficiency has to do with the development and 
evolution of new types of markets, firms and industries that create and deliver value to consumers.  
While there are links between static and dynamic market efficiency these are problematic.  For 
example, larger, more powerful, firms may be able to devote more resources to innovation and 
thereby aid the evolutionary process.  But they may also block or suppress undesirable (from their 
point of view) new competitors and be unable to recognize new types of opportunities that 
potentially undermine their existing position.   
Michael Porter is one who has argued for antitrust policy to focus on value, rather than just 
price and cost, and on dynamic rather than static efficiency, and he advocates the use of his 
frameworks for analyzing competition in industries and nations to assess antitrust cases.10  His 
research also suggests that variation in market shares rather than their mean distribution is a more 
effective indicator of dynamic efficiency.11  This is as a step forward in our understanding and 
measurement of dynamic efficiency in business systems but a clear underlying theory of business 
system dynamics and evolution is not articulated. Instead, a list of factors to consider in each case is 
presented, which hint at the underlying processes to which antitrust policy needs to direct its 
attention.  I believe that ideas from complexity theory and theories of cultural evolution can help 
                                                
10 Michael M. Porter Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity-Based Approach to Evaluating Mergers and Joint 
Ventures ANTITRUST BULL 46 (2001). 
11 M. Sakakibara, M. and Michael M. Porter Competing at Home to Win Abroad: Evidence from Japanese Industry 
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 83 (2001). 
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enrich and advance our understanding of the key processes driving the evolution of firms, markets 
and industries and provide a more coherent focus for antitrust policy.  
The title of this article is inspired by one by Richard Dawkins, the eminent Neo-Darwinian 
biologist, entitled “The evolution of evolvability,” which was presented at the first Artificial Life 
conference at the Santa Fe Institute in 1987.12  The topic of evolvability goes to the heart of the 
problems confronting antitrust policymakers, who are concerned to influence, through regulation 
and enforcement, the process of evolution of business systems towards more desirable community 
outcomes, including efficiency and effectiveness.  Evolvability is the essence of dynamic 
efficiency, whereas static efficiency is about tinkering with an existing business system to achieve 
improved outcomes, not with how this will affect the process of future evolution of the system.   
The problem is that we cannot predict the future of business evolution, any more than we 
can predict the future of natural evolution.  The history and existing nature of business systems 
affect how they can and cannot evolve but in ways we cannot fathom in advance because of the 
complex, nonlinear, self-organizing, adaptive nature of the systems involved.  Complexity and 
evolutionary theory teach us how starting conditions and history matter and how micro interactions 
and adaptations lead to emergent macro patterns, and that systems gravitate towards different types 
of attractors depending on chance factors and tipping points that are only knowable from hindsight. 
At first sight this seems to be an argument for anything goes and for no antitrust policy 
because anyone’s guess about the future is as good as anyone else’s.  I disagree.  The role of 
antitrust policy is to help encourage and select business systems for their evolvability, not to control 
or predict evolution.  It is crucial to realize and emphasize that antitrust policy makers and enforcers 
do not stand outside of the world of business, observing it in some godlike manner, issuing edicts 
                                                
12 Richard Dawkins The Evolution of Evolvability in Langton supra (1987). 
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and making up rules and enforcing them.  It is part of the system.  It affects, through its actions and 
responses, what business does and how it evolves.  It is itself directly and indirectly affected by 
business, society and academia and, over time, it develops and evolves. Interactions with business 
and academia take place all the time, through lobbying activities, informal and formal meetings, 
confrontations in the courts and in its responses to what business and academics do and say. In 
short, a co-evolutionary process is going on involving antitrust policy makers and enforcers 
(including lawyers and Law Schools), business (including managers, workers, consumers, and other 
stakeholders) and academia (including economists and Business Schools).  The problem for 
antitrust policy is not how to control and direct business in beneficial ways but to participate in the 
system of business in a way that contributes to the productive evolution of the evolvability of 
business systems.  
Business systems are living systems, business ecosystems,13 and if they cannot evolve they 
will eventually stagnate and die, because they will be unable to cope with and contribute to 
changing business contexts, including new types of ideas, technologies, demands, competitors and 
natural conditions.  In order to understand this more clearly, and what it means for antitrust, we 
need to understand the nature of evolutionary processes, starting with biology and then moving on 
to cultural systems, which includes business systems.  
II The Nature of the Evolutionary Process 
Figure 1 depicts the main elements of evolution in terms of two key processes.  First is the existence 
of entities that are capable of being reproduced over time.  In biology the entities are the genes that 
are replicated as genotypes are passed from generation to generation.  Genes are essentially 
subroutines that become expressed and used in some kind of order over time as a plant or animal 
                                                
13 James Moore THE DEATH OF COMPETITION (1996). 
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develops into its phenotype.14  In cultural evolution, including business culture, the entities that are 
replicated through time are called by different researchers’ cultural traits, routines or 
competencies.15 These are acquired or modified by social learning, including teaching, imitation 
and other forms of social transmission and affect behaviour.16  Dawkins calls to the basic entities of 
cultural evolution memes that leap from mind to mind and are thereby reproduced, altered, 
reconfigured, and diffused through time and space.17  Memes include ideas, knowledge, beliefs, 
values, skills, capacities, attitudes and orientations.  But an individual idea is not really equivalent 
to a subroutine, as genes are, unless we define memes to include a related set of ideas that constitute 
a way of doing something.  These could be called meme complexes but to keep things simple I will 
use the term meme to refer to the subroutines expressed in cultural and business life. 
*** Insert Figure 1 about here 
Genes and memes do not exist in isolation but form genotypes or memotypes i.e. 
assortments of cultural traits that characterize a particular person, group or firm, that govern the 
way a phenotype develops and behaves.  In biology, phenotypes are the myriad of types of flora and 
fauna that develop from the population of genotypes existing in a generation.  The success of 
phenotypes affects whether or not the genes governing their behaviour will be passed on to the next 
generation, whether they will survive.  In cultural evolution, phenotypes refer to the characteristic 
patterns of behaviour and responses of people and organisations that are operating under the 
                                                
14 Richard Dawkins THE DEVILS CHAPLAIN (2003). 
15 Richard R. Nelson and Sidney Winter AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). 
16 Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd NOT BY GENES ALONE : HOW CULTURE TRANSFORMED HUMAN 
EVOLUTION (2004).  
17 Susan Blackmore The Meme Machine (1999). 
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influence of different sets of memes or cultural traits. The term business model is sometimes used to 
refer to the mix of traits characterizing a particular type of firm’s manner of operation and response 
and is a kind of business analogue to the concept of a genotype in biology.  Just as in biology, the 
success of a business model or memotype in its environment affects which memes or traits get 
reproduced over time and place.   
Genes and memes do two things.18  They influence the development of the phenotype and 
they get themselves reproduced.  The success of different phenotypes depends on the environment 
in which they develop and operate.  The environment comprises the material world, the world of 
physics, chemistry and biochemistry, as well as other phenotypes that co-exist and with which a 
phenotype interacts.  Natural selection refers to the struggle among phenotypes to develop and 
survive in a particular environment, independently or in cooperation.  The same principle applies to 
biological and cultural evolution.   
For genes to get themselves copied into the next generation, more than survival is required.  
Sexual selection, Darwin’s other theory as Dawkins refers to it,19 focuses on the struggle among 
males and females to find and secure mates with whom they can cooperate in passing on their genes 
to future generations.  Genes that are useful for sexual selection may not be the same as and may 
even conflict with genes for natural selection, leading to some weird and wonderful sexual 
dynamics.  An analog to sexual selection exists in cultural and business evolution, which we may 
                                                
18 Dawkins supra  (1987).  
19 Dawkins supra (2003). 
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term “business mating.”20  This refers to the ability of firms to cooperate with other firms in 
achieving their goals. 
The nature of business is commonly depicted in terms of natural selection with a focus on 
competition as the driving force.  Firms continually struggle to survive in dynamic markets through 
creating and sustaining differential advantage.21  But cooperation also matters and in recent years 
there has been an explosion of interest in the nature, role and importance of business relations and 
networks in shaping business behaviour and performance. The ability to form successful business 
relations with suppliers, customers, complementors and even competitors, and the ability to join and 
help co-produce mutually productive networks of such relations, requires competences that are 
different from but complementary to those involved in the struggle for competitive advantage.  
Firms cooperate to compete and compete to cooperate.22  Firms are selected for their mating 
abilities as well as their competitive abilities and this creates selection pressures and transmission 
biases for particular types of business subroutines or competencies that could not be explained by 
natural or competitive selection and a focus on the firm as an isolated economic actor.  Just as in the 
animal kingdom, people and firms struggle to choose and get chosen by better business mates and 
who mates with whom in business is not random, as assumed in perfectly competitive markets, but 
is a form of assortative mating. However, to date there has been only limited research directly 
addressing the issue of who mates with whom in business.23   
                                                
20 Ian F. Wilkinson, Louise C. Young and Per Freytag Business Mating: Who Chooses Whom and Gets Chosen? 
INDUSTRIAL MARKETING MANAGEMENT (2005). 
21 Wroe Alderson MARKETING BEHAVIOR AND EXECUTIVE ACTION (1957). 
22 Ian F. Wilkinson and Louise C. Young On Cooperating: Firms, Relations and Networks J. OF BUSINESS 
RESEARCH 55 (2002). 
23 Wilkinson et al supra (2005). 
 10 
Table 1 summarizes the previous discussion and shows the terms used to describe key 
components of the evolutionary process in biology and business 
*** insert Table 1 about here 
I now focus on cultural evolution as this lies at the heart of our understanding of the 
development and spread of business systems and practices and the development of appropriate 
antitrust policies.  The main processes that cause cultural change and evolution, that affect the 
number and mix of cultural variants in a focal population, have been summarized by Richerson and 
Boyd.24  Inertial forces tend to reproduce the same cultural variants over time and result from 
unbiased sampling and faithful copying of memes. Forces for change comprise two types:  (a) 
transmission biases that make people and firms more likely to encounter and adopt some memes 
rather than others and adapt their behaviour accordingly; and (b) natural selection, which affects 
what happens to people and firms that have different cultural variants or memotypes, whether they 
succeed or not and hence their memes are perpetuated or not, and whether they become models to 
copy or not.  These processes represent generic types of targets for antitrust policy, as is explained 
in the next section. 
B Normative Implications of an Evolutionary Perspective 
The evolutionary view has implications for firm strategy and for policy. For firms the strategic 
issues are how to effectively participate in the complex, self organizing, adaptive, evolving business 
systems of which they are necessarily a part.  For antitrust policy the challenge is to influence 
transmission biases and natural selection processes so as to improve the evolvability of a nation’s 
business systems of which it is a part, including: (a) weakening inertial forces that tend to reproduce 
the same business systems over time, when environmental variation calls for new business models;  
                                                
24 Richerson and Boyd supra (2004). 
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(b) shaping transmission biases to enhance productive entrepreneurial, innovation and imitation 
processes and (c) influencing natural selection processes, including the birth and death of firms, to 
ensure that the pool of cultural variants in the business population remains viable and varied, such 
that it opens up rather than narrows future development opportunities and evolutionary paths. 
In order to understand the meaning of these type of policies we have to understand some of 
the main types of characteristics of CAS and the way they evolve.25   
III Main Characteristics of Complex Adaptive Systems 
A History Matters 
History focuses attention on temporal and sequence effects, which are manifest in many ways.  
First, starting conditions affect the way a CAS behaves over time and the kinds of attractors that 
can emerge.  This means that firms and business systems are restricted in what they can sense and 
the evolutionary pathways they can follow based on where they start from.  Second, once we start 
down one evolutionary pathway it tends to block off some others, or what we refer to as path 
dependence.  What is new about this?  We always knew that firms could only act based on their 
resources, competences and orientations.  Complexity teaches us a more profound lesson that the 
way we search forward in time and adapt is biased and may miss viable and better alternative 
evolutionary pathways and opportunities.  We see this in research on innovation and the 
entrepreneurial process, which shows how prior knowledge affects our ability to recognize and 
discover new opportunities because it limits the kinds of links among existing and new ideas we are 
                                                
25 For further discussion see Ian F. Wilkinson and Louise C. Young Toward A Normative Theory of Normative 
Marketing Theory” J. OF MARKETING THEORY (2005). 
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able to make.26  Thus, collectively and individually we can only see and reach some futures.  As the 
Irish joke goes, if you want to get to there I would not start from here!  There is no guarantee that 
the assortments of knowledge that exist in the minds and memories of people and firms will allow 
us to recognize, let alone successfully exploit, all the opportunities available or even the best ones, 
and the ones that can recognize opportunities may not best able to exploit them.  
The third way history matters is in terms of the temporal order, or sequence of events, and 
the tempo or rhythm of events.  Simulations of complex systems show that order effects can change 
evolutionary paths and outcomes, not just the mix of types of events or factors influencing a system.  
History plays out over time and key events or sequences of events and factors, such as the entry 
order of competitors, the sequences of technologies, or confronting particular types of problems or 
selective disadvantages early rather than later in a firm and industry’s development can have major 
impacts on subsequent patterns of success and development.27  Earlier events set the stage, alter the 
starting conditions, for sensing and responding to later events, which in turn affect the kinds of 
opportunities that can and are recognized and acted on by firms.  A particular example is that of 
bifurcation or tipping points, in which small apparently insignificant events can entrain patterns of 
development and evolution far into the future – the proverbial butterfly affecting global weather or 
the positive feedbacks resulting from one technology getting a head start e.g. Beta vs VCR.28  Order 
effects are reflected in the learning and knowledge development processes in firms and industries, 
                                                
26 Israel Kirzner Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach” J. OF ECON 
LIT XXXV (1997). 
27 Michael M. Porter THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990). 
28 W. Brian Arthur Complexity and the Economy SCIENCE 284 (1999).  
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which enable and constrain future developmental pathways, such as of the kind identified by 
Levinthal and March,29 Simon30 and in Levitt’s concept of marketing myopia.31   
The effects of history are hard to see when much empirical analysis in business, economics 
and social science is cross sectional and variance based.32  One of the lessons of research on 
complexity is to highlight the impact of historical processes and contingencies.  Moreover, the 
increasing pace of change, speed of communication and far reaching inter-dependencies among 
businesses and economic systems across and within industries, technologies and nations makes their 
impact more difficult to ignore.    
What can be done?  At heart the task is to increase the ability to make productive links 
among ideas, both new and old, as well as facilitating the exploitation of the opportunities so 
recognized.  There is a principle that seems relevant first espoused by Wroe Alderson, one of the 
founders of modern marketing theory. He called it the power principle: to act so as to promote the 
ability to act.33   
Much research has focused on the way new ideas and innovations arise and diffuse in a 
social or business system.  Much of it falls under the heading of entrepreneurship and it has become 
a hot topic and course offering in many business schools of late.  The focus of research in this area 
                                                
29 David A. Levinthal  and James A. March The Myopia of Learning STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT J. (1993). 
30 Herbert Simon, H. Strategy and Organizational Evolution STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT J. 14 (1993). 
31 Theodore T. Levitt THE MARKETING IMAGINATION (1986). 
32 Gary J. Buttriss and Ian F. Wilkinson From variables to event based models of business J OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENTREPRENUERSHIP (in press). 
33 Alderson supra (1957). 
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used to be on the characteristics of the entrepreneur rather than the opportunity discovery process 
itself, but this has changed.  The focus has shifted to examining the way different types of 
opportunities are discovered or discoverable.  A critical role is played by the prior knowledge 
people and firms have, their access to new types of information, and the way new ideas come from 
combining existing ideas in new ways.34   
One way of priming the innovation process is to facilitate new types of potentially 
productive knowledge combinations.  For example, I am involved in research trying to develop 
intelligent software agents to mine the internet for knowledge combinations that could prime the 
opportunity discovery process.35 Another development in Australia is the Bridge network concept 
base on the ideas (memes) of John Wolpert.36  This initiative links firms in high tech industries in 
networks via trusted intermediaries who overcome some of the barriers to proprietary information 
sharing.  In this way some of the potential opportunities from combining knowledge across firms in 
the network are identified that otherwise would not be seen.  The potential opportunities are a 
function of the assortment of firms and knowledge that exist within the network and the potential 
productivity of new knowledge combinations from within that assortment.  
Restrictions on the flow of information that limit the kinds of new knowledge combinations 
that can arise necessarily constrain the innovation and evolutionary process.  Most of the great 
inventions of the past such as language, organisations, the printing press, intermediaries, the 
transistor, computers, high speed travel, communication and the internet have their impact not so 
                                                
34 Scott Shane Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 11 
(2000). 
35  For more details see http://research.it.uts.edu.au/emarkets/.   
36 John Wolpert Breaking out of the Innovation Box HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW August (2002). 
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much directly but from the way they free up the flow of information and allow productive new 
knowledge combinations (opportunities) to be discovered and acted on.  See for example David 
Bodanis’s summary of the myriad consequences of the transistor.37  Each of these significant 
inventions represent a new platform for evolution to work on and are the cultural equivalent of the 
“invention” in nature of replicators, multi-cellular organisms, life, communication systems, 
mammals and minds.38  
Restrictions on the formation of potentially productive knowledge links can take many 
forms and antitrust law may wish to consider some of these.  For example, one way new knowledge 
combinations arise is when people move between firms.  But contractual clauses that limit 
disclosure and the types of firms an ex-employee can work for obviously limit the kinds of 
knowledge combinations that can occur.  Against this is the issue of protecting the rights of those 
who have valuable knowledge to exploit and the incentives to find and exploit new opportunities. 
On a more general level, the ability of a population of organisations to evolve and adapt in 
superior ways to each other and to changing environmental conditions depends on the variety within 
and between the organisations.  This idea goes back to Ross Ashby’s original concept of requisite 
variety, which states that the ability of a system to deal with its environment depends on matching 
the variety of the environment within the responding system.39  In business systems the variety is 
reflected in the assortment of cultural variants or memotypes in the population of firms.  Research 
on biological systems shows that the same or similar phenotypes may arise from different 
genotypes and co-exist in the population.  When environmental conditions change, this variety in 
                                                
37 David Bodanis ELECTRIC UNIVERSE (2005). 
38 Dawkins supra (1989). 
39 W. Ross Ashby DESIGN FOR A BRAIN (1952).  
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the genotypes plays an important role in providing different pathways forward.  Genotypes will 
vary in how they respond and survive in the changed conditions and hence explore a wider space of 
possibilities.  But if all the genotypes were the same, for example optimized to the current 
conditions, this would limit the response alternatives to random mutations and local differences in 
context.   
Similar arguments apply to the evolvability of business systems and the range of generating 
memotypes underlying current firm behaviour.  We know from studies of business evolution that 
radically new types of products and industries often come from outside the existing mainstream, in 
part because the mainstream tends to become myopic and restricted in their ability and willingness 
to recognize and exploit new types of business models, especially those that undermine traditional 
ways of thinking and behaving, so called disruptive technologies.40  
B Interaction and Feedbacks Matter 
The second major contribution of complexity theory is to focus attention on the connections 
between the parts of a system as opposed to the properties of the individual parts.  There are three 
aspects to this: the way micro interactions taking place among existing parts drives overall system 
behavior, the way overall system behavior has feedback effects on the behavior of the parts, and the 
way the pattern of interactions over time creates the parts themselves.   
A complex adaptive system comprises a network of interconnected, interacting entities, 
actors or agents and overall system behaviour arises from the micro interactions taking place among 
them in a bottom up fashion.  In addition the overall or macro behavior of the system has feedback 
effects on the parts, such as the way moves in share price indicators affect individual actors tock 
market behavior, in a top down fashion.  This perspective contrasts with much of business and 
                                                
40 Clayton Christensen The Innovators Dilemma (2000). 
 17 
economic theory, which focuses on the number and properties of individual economic actors 
considered in isolation, including their decision-making and management characteristics.41 In 
economic and business systems interactions and feedback effects among activities, actors, resources 
and ideas or schemas all play an important role in shaping behaviour and evolution.42  A system 
cannot be reduced to the behavior of its parts, interactions matter.  In business systems, these 
interactions are the means by which resources are accessed and created, problems are and 
opportunities are identified and confronted, innovations and adoptions occur, knowledge is shared 
and developed and value is created and developed.43   
The implication for antitrust policy is that the relevant units of adaptation and evolution are 
not individual firms competing in a focal horizontal market but networks of interconnected, 
interdependent, interacting firms and other organisations spanning various markets, industries and 
technologies.  These networks together create and deliver value to intermediate and end consumers 
and develop and co-evolve over time through their internal and external actions, responses and 
interactions. This involves a continual process of configuring and reconfiguring the connections 
between actors in the network, changes in the actors in the network and the role they play and the 
creation and destruction of new types of actors and relations. This co-evolutionary process cannot 
be understood, the main forces that drive development and evolution cannot be identified, and the 
potential role and impact of antitrust policy cannot be fathomed without focusing on the structure 
and behaviour of relevant business networks.    
                                                
41 See for example Phillip Ball CRITICAL MASS: HOW ONE THING LEADS TO ANOTHER (2005). 
42 Catherine Welch and Ian F. Wilkinson Idea Logics and Network Theory in Business Marketing J. OF BUSINESS TO 
BUSINESS MARKETING 8 (2002).  
43 See Wilkinson and Young supra (2005). 
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The individual firm, or set of competing firms in one market, are limited in their ability to 
sense, understand and respond to their environment compared to a network of firms spanning 
different markets and industries.  The underlying principle is Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety. 
The variety of an individual firm’s responses is limited by the capacity of its management to sense, 
understand and respond to its environment, a network of firms has a potentially far greater variety 
of responses, which is limited only by the alternative configurations of relations and interactions 
that can develop within and between them.  
There are many examples of the increasing attention being given to the role and importance 
of business relations and networks in driving performance, competitiveness, innovation and 
adaptability. The paper by Hakansson in this special issue includes an account of some of the 
research and thinking of the IMP group about the nature and importance of relations and networks 
and I will not repeat them here.  Two examples will suffice.  One is the recognition that innovation 
takes place more between firms and other organisations, rather than within them.44  The relevant 
interactions here are not limited to those associated with a particular market but cut across markets 
both horizontally and vertically and across technologies, regions and nations and include 
interactions with suppliers, customers, competitors and complementors.  Interaction and feedback 
effects with the natural environment are becoming an increasing focus of attention, setting ultimate 
limits to the long term evolution and sustainability of economic systems.45 
                                                
44 See for example Henry Chesborough OPEN INNOVATION (2003), John Hagel, and John Seeley Brown Productive 
Friction HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW February (2005), Subroto Roy, K. Sivakumar, and Ian F. Wilkinson 
Innovation Generation in Supply Chain Relationships – A Conceptual Model and Research Propositions J. OF THE 
ACADEMY OF MARKETING SCIENCE 32 (2004).  
45 Jared Diamond COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED (2004). 
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The second example is the concept of the extended phenotype or extended enterprise and 
soft assembled strategies.46  Genes, as Dawkins, has pointed out, are not limited in their expression 
to the body and behavior of the phenotype it happens to be embedded in.47 They are also capable of 
affecting the development and behavior of other animals and plants and this has implications for 
survival and reproduction and hence affects the evolutionary process.  He refers to the effects of 
genes from one animal or plant on linked plants and animals as the extended phenotype.  In the 
same way firms and people make use of the resources and innate characteristics of their local 
environment and network as an extension of their senses, memory, resources and mind, such that 
the boundary of the self or firm is negotiable and flexible.48  
Unfortunately most business disciplines focus attention primarily on the management of the 
individual firm and what drives its efficiency, competitiveness and performance.  This is 
understandable as firms employ most of the graduates from our business programs, help fund these 
programs and managers are the main buyers of consulting services.  But the types of environment in 
which firms now operate tend to generate problems and opportunities that are beyond the ability of 
firms to sense, comprehend or respond to independently.  Such environments are variously 
described as turbulent, complex or hypercompetitive.  In such conditions the relevant units of 
analysis are not individual firms but networks of interrelated and interdependent firms and 
organisations spanning industries, markets, technologies and nations that create major strategic 
problems and opportunities for firms and policy makers alike.  
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Complexity theory suggests that antitrust policy needs to focus attention more on the nature 
and role of these networks and on the different types of interaction and feedback mechanisms 
operating if it is to participate meaningfully in the business system’s development and evolution.  
But the relevant interactions are not under the direct control or influence of government policy and 
governments have to learn how to recognise qualitatively different types of evolutionary pathways 
and tipping points, so as to help steer business away from pathological attractors.  This, of course, 
much easier to say than do but research in complexity provides some guidelines.    
Hakansson, in his paper in this special issue, explains how a focus on interactions and 
networks changes our view of the way firms and markets behave. Markets are seen as networks of 
exchange relations developed between firms in and across markets that shape the way a particular 
market behaves and evolves.  The relations and networks that exist as a result of history constrain 
and direct the behavior of those involved and, at the same time, the experience and outcomes of 
behaviour reproduce, strengthen, weaken or change these relations and networks. In this way the 
ongoing patterns of action and interaction over time create the organisations and networks 
comprising a business system, as is further elaborated in the next section. 
C Dissipative Structures 
So far I have taken the existence of economic actors, usually firms, as given and focused on the role 
and importance of the connections between them as driving performance, innovation and 
adaptation.  But complexity research directs our attention to the very nature and existence of the 
actors in complex adaptive systems.  It makes the process primary, the continual flow of action and 
interaction, and economic actors like firms are produced out of this ongoing flux.  The come into 
existence as recognizable, reproduced patterns of action and interaction among people and objects 
over time, or what are called dissipative structures.  
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To illustrate we may use the analogy of a river. The continuous flow of water downstream in 
a river results in the formation of local patterns of repeated behaviour, such as eddies or whirlpools.  
These are local structures that are reproduced over time through an ever changing stream of water 
molecules following the same patterns of behaviour.  The eddies and whirlpools are macro 
structures that arise, in a self organizing manner, from the ongoing local interactions taking place 
among an ever-changing stream of water molecules in a river bed. Over time, as conditions change, 
due to increased or decreased water flow, erosion and local environmental impacts, the pattern and 
location of eddies and whirlpools changes. Eddies, whirlpools and business firms and networks are 
examples of what are called dissipative structures, a concept developed by Ilya Prigogene, which 
won him a Nobel Prize.   Dissipative structures are what complexity is about.   
In this view non-change rather than change becomes problematic.49  Why do firms and 
networks which embody particular characteristic patterns of behaviour persist? How are these 
patterns reproduced over time amidst the constant flux of actions and interactions taking place? This 
approach offers, I believe, additional insights for guiding antitrust policies.   
Antitrust policy focuses on the structure and conduct of firms in markets as a means of 
improving overall economic performance.  The underlying assumption is that firms organize the 
activities taking place in markets and the number of firms in a market and the way they individually 
behave matters.  After all, isn’t it firms who make decisions about how and when to act and 
interact?  An alternative perspective focuses attention on the ongoing processes taking place, the 
actions and interactions, and how these create firms rather than the way firms create the patterns of 
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actions and interactions.50  The business of antitrust is to help shape the kinds of interaction and 
feedbacks that lead to the right kinds of firms and networks evolving, rather than controlling the 
firms and networks that happen to exist at a particular time and place in order to produce the right 
kinds of interaction and feedbacks.   
D Networks Matter 
The foregoing discussion highlights the role and importance of networks in business systems.  
Antitrust theory can draw on research on the nature and evolution of networks to inform its 
understanding of business networks and how government policy could play a productive role in 
business evolution.  Our understanding of network structures and their effects has improved 
significantly in recent years as a result of the study of complexity.51  Neo-classical economic theory 
of perfect markets assumes a random mixing of suppliers and customers resulting in a random 
network of trades.  If extended to other vertically linked or complementary markets a larger random 
network configuration would be the result.  Business networks would comprise fleeting interactions 
among a set of equal sized small suppliers and customers and this model seems to be the basis of 
much antitrust policy around the world.  Distortions or failures of perfect markets in the form of 
monopolies and imperfect competition, whether they arise for natural or contrived reasons, are a 
central focus of antitrust cases.  It is generally assumed that such failures are not in the consumers’ 
or societies’ interests and they need to be controlled or reconfigured.  Unfortunately research shows 
that networks of people and firms (as well as other entities) do not develop into such random 
network structures.   
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Depending on the patterns of interaction taking place and the way they are interconnected 
over time and place, different types of trading networks and associated patterns of exchange 
relations can emerge which have characteristic properties.  These properties are a source of 
opportunities and threats.  The focus for antitrust theory and policy is to understand the processes of 
network development and evolution and to identify ways of intervening that influence these 
processes in productive ways, rather than simply regulating firms occupying particular network 
positions that are the outcomes of these processes.  The outcomes, in a sense, are inevitable; it is the 
processes of business development and evolution that require more attention than the structure it 
produces.  The structure reflects the processes at work and only temporary reconfigurations are 
possible if the underlying processes remain unchanged. 
What are the types of networks that can arise?  Which ones should we be more concerned 
about? And what types of processes produce different kinds?  These are all big questions and I do 
not believe we have firm answers yet but lots of intriguing work is going on.  As Barabarasi, one of 
the leaders in this field, has commented, there is a “zoo of network types out there.”52  For our 
purposes three non-random types deserve our attention - structured, clustered or small world, and 
hub or scale free networks.  Structured networks are those following a fixed regular pattern of 
connection, such as a lattice or grid, and usually reflect a network deliberately designed for some 
purpose.  Such networks generally do not grow naturally as there usually is no designer or network 
controller. Instead, network structures emerge in a self organizing way from the patterns of 
interactions taking place and the way they develop over time. 
                                                
52 Cited in Ball supra (2005). 
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Small world networks have received much attention owing to the research of Strogatz and 
Watts.53  Small world networks are those in which each node is only a few steps or links away from 
any other node, even though the network is not richly interconnected.  Most links are clustered 
together around those nearby in some way e.g. space, behaviour, beliefs, and these local networks 
tend to be highly interlinked or clustered.  People who know you well probably know each other; 
firms compete and trade more with those serving the same customers or using similar suppliers and 
inputs.  But some links are with other nodes that are not part of the local network and which may be 
“far away” in some sense.  These long reach links have the effect of reducing significantly the 
average distance in links between nodes in a network.  The importance of these links in business 
and markets is reflected in Ronald Burt’s work on the importance of structural holes54 and Mark 
Granovetter’s research concerning the strength of weak ties.55  They show how long reach links 
tend to be weak links but are an important source of new information and ideas.  This is because 
strongly interconnected people or firms are more likely to know what each other knows, whereas 
long reach links may bridge structural holes in networks, acting as bridges between otherwise non 
connected networks or parts of a network.  For example, the nature and role of entrepreneurs can be 
explained in part by the way people or firms are positioned in communication networks such that 
they gain access to potentially productive assortments of knowledge and ideas that others do not.  
By bridging structural holes in the network they are able to gain strategic advantages in terms of 
opportunity discovery and exploitation.  Unfortunately, it is not yet possible to identify all the 
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structural holes that might be occupied productively, or to estimate how many of them have been 
occupied – but the internet and the death of distance is having an effect I am sure. 
The third form of network structure is the hub or scale free network, which can be confused 
with a small world network because it does have small world properties – nodes are on average not 
far from each other in terms of number of links.  But scale free networks have a distinctive 
distribution of links per node called a power law, which is quite different to the normal or Gaussian 
distribution we are familiar with from courses in statistics.  If the frequency distribution of links per 
node followed a normal distribution, we would expect most nodes to be around the middle of the 
distribution with a tail on either side.  The central tendency or mean reflects the scale of the 
distribution or where it is located on a scale of number of links per node.  A power law has no 
central tendency or characteristic scale, instead most nodes have very few links and the frequency 
of nodes with x links falls off rapidly as x increases.  On a log log scale, showing the cumulative 
frequency of nodes by number of links, the curve is a straight line.  This means that some links have 
a very large number of links, while most do not.  These are the hubs in the network.  Such network 
patterns have been found in many situations including earthquakes, ecological systems, cities, 
friendship networks, sexual partners, movie actors, co-authorships, patent links and trading 
networks.   
Iansiti and Levien in their analysis of business ecologies refer to hubs in this type of 
network structure as keystones, with Microsoft being an important example.56  This has led to some 
controversy over whether hubs are a good or bad thing in economic terms, especially with the 
recent Antitrust Case concerning Microsoft.  Such a network position seems obviously good for 
Microsoft but is it good for the US and the world economy to have such hubs?  Can and should 
Microsoft’s behaviour and the structure of the networks in which it is involved be changed or 
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controlled in some way and who and how should this be done? The increasing globalization of the 
world’s economies makes business systems and networks span the world rather than being weakly 
interconnected national business systems.  This makes the problem of developing and implementing 
antitrust policies even more difficult, as they involve policy coordination across nations.  
Research on the nature and formation of networks offers some guidance.  First, such scale 
free networks seem to be characteristic of any living system and reflect the way networks grow 
naturally.  The underlying rule for development may be summarized in terms of the “the rich get 
richer.”  As a network grows new nodes are more likely to form links with, be attracted to, or find, 
nodes that are themselves already well connected.  The probability of a new node linking with 
another node depends on how many links the other node already has.  Thus people and firms are 
more likely to form links with people and firms who already have more links with other people and 
firms.  Various psychological, social and economic mechanisms lead to this type of behaviour, 
which represent forms of positive feedback effects.  In the case of Microsoft, the network 
economies involved in using a computer operating system that many already use is the main 
positive feedback mechanism.  
Trading or exchange networks are likely to form scale free networks because they grow by 
similar processes to those described.  In markets the pattern of market shares among brands and 
firms follows a power law type distribution, reflecting the frequency of purchase and amount 
bought by customers over a period.  The trading relations firms have with their suppliers and 
customers is usually characterized in terms of the 80:20 rule whereby 20% say of its customers 
account for 80% of its business.  The number of trading relations firms have with others firms 
might also follow some kind of power law distribution although data on this is limited.  In 
economic theory the development of scale-free networks is reflected in models of markets with 
strong network externalities, which is a special type of rich get richer development rule.  These 
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markets result in outcomes in which the winner takes most of the market - a scale free network with 
hubs.57   
Hence we should expect power law distributions and hubs to arise.  It is not the property of 
the firm or person occupying the hub that causes it to become a hub, it is an outcome of the way 
networks grow and evolve.  How should we deal with them and what are the benefits and dangers?  
Are they another form of natural monopoly that requires government regulation, as is sometimes 
argued?  Hubs are a type of network role or position that emerges naturally in any living business or 
economic system. What matters is how easy it is for rivals to take over hub positions from others if 
they can offer better value. This is the main worry for antitrust policy makers.  The degree of 
competition for hub roles, by definition, is not indicated by the presence of many equally strong 
rival hub positions in a network as this would not be a scale free network.  Hub competition is 
reflected in how contestable the market for hub roles are, which refers to the ease or difficulty with 
which other firms are able to move into hub roles. 58  This includes existing minor hubs in the 
network, which in the case of Microsoft would include alternative operating systems such as Apple, 
Linux and UNIX, as well as organizations occupying hub or keystone positions in related networks, 
such as Google, Amazon, PC or internet connection providers.   
Governments can move into hub roles by taking over and controlling hub firms in the public 
interest.  However, it is not clear that government managed hubs are desirable in evolutionary 
terms.  If firms occupying hub roles are subject to government takeover and the free release of core 
technology, they have incentives to disguise their “hubness” by promoting other hubs.  This leads to 
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a more visibly competitive hub market but how efficient and effective would it be and how would 
this affect the evolution of the network over time?  Another policy option is to break up hub firms, 
but if scale free networks are a natural result of interactions, breaking up Microsoft will just lead to 
the emergence of another operating system assuming the same powerful position.  Is this the way to 
go or would it damage evolvability? 
Can hubs become too powerful and control and direct the future evolution of the network in 
their own interests and against the larger good, or are there natural constraints that limit the power 
and reach of economic hubs or keystones like Microsoft.  I have already mentioned the 
contestability of hub positions as one limiting factor.  Others are suggested in research by 
Barabarasi.59  For example, there are limits to how many movies one actor can be in, how many 
friends an individual can have.  Firm size, technology and geographic constraints affect how many 
customers or suppliers a firm can handle.  In addition, firms and people are heterogeneous and there 
are forces of repulsion as well as attraction in networks, such that at times the rich may get poorer, 
at least for some in the network.  For example, some people have strong negative feelings about 
using Microsoft and are committed to other operating systems such as Apple or UNIX.   
Microsoft’s role is similar to an organisation being in control of the development and 
evolution of the English language.  You don’t have to use English but many people are using it 
because so many people already use it in business, science and social life around the world.  We 
might argue about whether we all speak the same English but let’s not get into that.  Languages 
evolve as new words are added, their meaning changes and the rules of grammar alter.  All of us are 
free to use words to say, write and think what we want in English but there are some things that are 
more easily said and thought in other languages, so I believe. No one controls the English language 
and regulates the core rules of grammar, spelling and meaning of words, although dictionaries and 
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rules of good English are produced.  Indeed, its living nature comes from the way these standards 
change over time and how innovations in language arise and spread.  Attempts to control a language 
tend to fail or be counterproductive , as has happened for example with the French language.  
Despite the attempts to control it the French language has evolved and in ways not necessarily 
desired by the French government.  Does this mean Microsoft is unable to control the evolution of 
operating systems and the way they are used?  From my limited understanding of the technicalities 
involved Microsoft seems potentially more powerful than the French government is in controlling 
French. It power comes from the core of its operating system, which is only made available to 
developers in machine code form such that it cannot be altered by anyone other than Microsoft.  If 
this is so evolvability is constrained.  How serious this is and how difficult it is to work around this 
constraint is hard to say.  Operating systems like languages evolve and people and firms can switch 
operating systems and languages when the value of an alternative becomes greater and switching 
costs do not wipe out the benefits. 
There is no simple answer to all these questions and problems but complexity theory and its 
associated methodologies help us address them more clearly.  In the remainder of this article I will 
consider the potentially good and bad characteristics of a scale free business networks, their 
evolution and evolvability and the role antitrust policy could play.  
IV Nature, Role and Regulation of Scale Free Business Networks 
Scale free networks are resilient because random failures of parts of the network do not affect its 
connectivity and functioning very much.  However, if hubs can be identified such networks are 
vulnerable to attack.  This implies that we need to be worried about the failure of a Microsoft, as 
this could lead to a rapid contagion and damage throughout the networks of organizations directly 
and indirectly linked to it.  As a keystone Microsoft is equally good at enabling value creation in 
others and in rapidly spreading damage by inhibiting and biasing the efforts of others.  It is the latter 
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possibility that lies at the heart of much discussion about regulating Microsoft.  Microsoft occupies 
a hub position in business networks that gives it the power to do good or evil and most economic 
theory assumes that monopolists like this will use their power in their own interests and against the 
interests of the many.   
We need to distinguish between the effects of regulating the behaviour or breaking up 
existing hubs on the performance and behaviour of others in the network and effects on the 
evolution and evolvability of the network.  For example, will regulating a hub tend to ensure its 
continuation as a hub, preventing other forms of network evolution?  Will breaking it up lead to the 
emergence of another hub with similar characteristics, which then has to prosecuted all over again, 
or will it lead to some process of network evolution that will be better or worse?  In order to answer 
these questions we need some idea of how networks evolve over time.  After all, there used to be 
business networks before Microsoft.   
Business networks evolve through a process of reconfiguring the links among actors 
(business, government, lawyers, and educators), activities, resources and schemas.  Incremental 
changes are taking place all the time through the ongoing flow of activities taking place.  Resources 
are being used and created, strengthened and weakened, learning and knowledge development and 
diffusion is taking place.  Radical changes involve significant and novel types of reconfiguration.  
How does a scale free network affect the evolutionary process?  Innovations involve generating new 
ideas and which come from recombining existing ideas – they are not endogenously determined 
manna from heaven.60  Ideas get recombined through the research effort of individual actors and 
through the communication and interaction-taking place among and within actors.   
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Scale free networks help preserve ideas, both good and bad, because ideas are hard to 
eliminate completely.  This is shown by research on the spread of viruses in human and internet 
environments.  Although programs targeted at hubs can significantly reduce their presence and 
spread in the network, they remain in parts of the network ready to spring into action when network 
conditions permit.  Scale free networks also facilitate the recombining of ideas because of their 
small world character.  This helps ideas to be found and for ideas to find productive homes through 
communication networks.  No matter where ideas are located, they are not very far from others in 
the network.  This recombining is limited by the extent to which ideas are easily found, 
communicated and used by others and by the way knowledge is distributed throughout the network.  
Some ideas are locked away by firms, protected by patents or not easily communicated or 
understood because they are tacit, sticky and embedded in relations and routines.61. 
Hubs play an important part in facilitating the spread of ideas and therefore influence 
innovation through impacts on the opportunity discovery and exploitation process.  As this is 
central to evolution and the evolvability of the network this subject should play an important role in 
antitrust policy deliberations.  This suggests that potential targets for antitrust policy are the various 
types of actual and potential transmission biases that could adversely affect evolvability.  Some of 
these already form part of antitrust policy because they are related to issues of static efficiency and 
price competition.  For example, misleading and deceptive practices result in biased transmission 
and affect the numbers and types of competitors which in turn limit the cultural variants for the 
evolutionary processes to work on.   
Other ways in which potentially productive recombination of ideas can be inhibited include: 
entry barriers to new types of firms; obstacles to new types of relations and interactions forming 
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among firms in and among different markets, industries and nations; the ability of workers to set up 
or move to new firms or nations in order to exploit innovations that their existing firms or nations 
are unwilling or unable to exploit; the limited exposure of some industries and parts of networks to 
international cooperative and competitive interactions; and the inability and unwillingness of firms 
to share information and ideas with other firms for fear of losing control of the ideas and/or 
damaging their own prospects compared to counterparts.  These are perennial problems that shape 
the kinds of business networks that arise, the firms that eventually become hubs, how these change 
over time and how efficient a given network is at any given time.   
The central issue is not to freeze business networks and antitrust policy in terms of a 
particular structure, pattern of conduct and/or regulation, but to ensure many natural experiments 
can and do take place among and within firms and in different policy domains, in order to give 
evolution more to work with. In this way the requisite variety of network and business systems is 
preserved and many potential evolutionary pathways are opened up rather than closed off.  Freezing 
a network or part of it is like killing off part of the living system, reducing it to be part of the 
environment rather than part of the living system and evolutionary process. 
A Agent Based Models of Markets Matter 
Tools to help us map and model the structure and evolution of business networks are now available 
to facilitate policy development and case analysis.62  Of particular relevance are agent based models 
of economic systems which offer ways of developing and testing our theories of business structure, 
conduct and evolution including the impact of various types of antitrust policies.  
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We cannot conduct experiments about the impact of different types of antitrust policies on 
actual economic systems.  It would be politically and managerially impossible to implement, 
extremely costly, be likely to damage whole industries and economic sectors, and take a long time. 
Instead, we need to construct evolutionary models of business networks that can be used to conduct 
such experiments, that can be used help us map out the potential range of outcomes implicit in 
particular network structures and processes and contexts, and that can help us understand what 
antitrust policy can and cannot do.  These models will include antitrust policy development and 
enforcement as part of the model, not standing outside, godlike, and merely imposing new rules as 
the occasion arises in the model.  Developments in computing systems and agent based modeling 
methods enable us to represent key aspects of complex adaptive systems, such as economic and 
business systems, and the ways they develop and evolve that hitherto have not been possible. These 
models allow managers and policy makers to develop and hone their experience, sensitivity and 
understanding of the complex systems in which they operate by providing realistic “flight 
simulator” type interfaces for them work with.  Systematic experiments can be conducted in these 
artificial worlds to learn about the range of outcomes possible under different conditions, including 
different types of intervention mechanisms, in ways analogous to biological and chemical 
experiments.63  An example of these kinds of models is an agent based model of the wholesale 
electricity markets in the US being developed by Leigh Tesfatsion and her colleagues, which is 
designed to test the economic reliability of the Wholesale Market Power Platform proposed by the 
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US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 2003.64  Such models will focus the attention of 
managers, policy makers and lawyers on key issues and assumptions that affect the development 
and evolution of the relevant business networks and their outcomes. In this way we can move 
beyond the existing narrow focus on static efficiency and price competition to considerations of 
dynamic efficiency, value and evolvability. 
V Conclusions 
I have argued that the main case for antitrust policy should be extended beyond its current focus on 
economizing (including both production and transaction costs), including market power as a key 
filter for identifying suspect cases.  The economy is a complex adaptive system and research on 
such systems focuses attention on their dynamics, evolution and network structure.  I suggest 
“evolvability” as an additional main case consideration which leads to a focus on networks costs 
and benefits  Transaction costs (and benefits) focus on individual transactions and relations in 
isolation.  Network costs (and benefits) focus attention on the connections between transactions and 
relations over time and place, including how business arrangements at one time limit or enable 
arrangements in the future.  Such considerations can be included in the rules of antitrust and be 
included in the process of antitrust case analysis and decision making.   
Incorporating such ideas into antitrust policy is not without its difficulties.  In particular it 
requires that they are administratively and politically feasible.  This of course has to do with the 
evolvability of the law, policymakers and lawyers, as well as business and law schools that are 
involved in the production and diffusion of relevant business memes!  Antitrust policy apparatus, 
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business schools and law schools do not stand outside business systems but are relevant and 
important actors in business ecosystems.  They affect and are affected by business practice and 
ideas about business practice.  Furthermore, in an increasingly globalized world business system, 
issues of evolvability and economizing are not confined to one nation but to interrelated networks 
of nations and their antitrust policies.  US antitrust policy and decisions impact other countries 
business systems and vice versa, which leads us into a much larger evolutionary arena.   
A way of facilitating policy development and case analysis is through the use of agent based 
models of relevant business networks.  These are capable of extending our understanding, analysis 
and theory in the area of business networks and their evolution and are a means of focusing policy 
debate and disputes in productive ways.  Agent based models are more than a technique; they are a 
modeling philosophy and a way of developing, analyzing and comparing theory and practice not 
possible in other ways. 
By introducing an evolutionary perspective, antitrust policies are seen in a new and helpful 
light and attention is directed to potential policy targets and mechanisms that may not otherwise be 
considered.  In order to do this we need to make use of methods and theories of business and 
economics drawn from complexity and network research.  We are at an exciting stage of 
development of these ideas, theories and methods and need to draw from them and contribute to 
them. 
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Figure 1 The Evolutionary Process* 
 
(Adapted from R. Dawkins 1998 p 202) 
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Table 1 Components of Evolution Processes in Biology and Business 
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